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STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLICt
Craig Joyce*

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC. By R. Kent Newmyer. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press. 1985. Pp. xvii, 490. Cloth, $33; paper, $14.95.
I

"I am the last of the old race of Judges," grieved a beleaguered
Joseph Story in the dark days of early 1837. "I stand their solitary
representative, with a pained heart, and a subdued confidence. Do you
remember the story of the last dinner of a club, who dined once a
year? I am in the predicament of the last survivor." 1
The sources of Story's gloom were not far to seek. John Marshall,
his colleague and steadfast friend during nearly a quarter century of
service on the Supreme Court, was dead. 2 Only Marshall's unique authority, coupled with the enormous personal esteem in which the great
Chief Justice was held by other members of the Court, had theretofore
stemmed the surging tide of Jacksonian Democracy that Story so
greatly feared. Now that bulwark was gone, leaving only Story himself to defend the edifice of constitutional and economic nationalism
that he and Marshall had labored so long to erect. In the Term just
ended, a new majority of the Court, led by Jackson's most recent
appointee, Chief Justice Roger Taney, had asserted itself unmistakably. In Mayor of New York v. Miln, 3 Story had been forced to enter a
rare, solitary dissent, claiming only the comfort of the posthumous
concurrence "of that great constitutional jurist, the late Mr. Chief Justice Marshall."4 In Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Ken-
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Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1970, Dartmouth
College; M.A. (Jurisprudence) 1972, Oxford University; J.D. 1975, Stanford Law School. The
author and Justice Story are old friends. See Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: A11
lnstitutio11a/ Perspective 011 Marshall Court Asce11da11cy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1985). - Ed.
1. Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau (Apr. 7, 1837), reprillted i11 2 J. STORY, LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 277 (W. Story ed. 1851) [hereinafter cited as LIFE AND LETTERS].
2. Marshall died on July 6, 1835. Anticipating his passing two weeks before the event, Story
had written to Richard Peters, Jr., the Court's Reporter: "Great, good, and excellent manl ••• I
shall never see his like again! His gentleness, his alfectionateness, his glorious virtues, his un·
blemished life, his exalted talentS, leave him without a rival or a peer." Joseph Story to Richard
Peters, Jr. (June 19, 1835), reprillted i11 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 1, at 199-200.
3. 36 U.S. (11Pet.)102 (1837) (upholding state exercise of police power in face of commerce
clause challenge).
4. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 161. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Marshall hnd
at least suggested that congressional power over interstate commerce was exclusive of the states.
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tucky, 5 Story had again dissented alone, prompted, he said, by
"profound reverence and affection" for the wisdom of Taney's predecessor. 6 Finally, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 the Court
had seemingly consigned to its dustbin of forgotten doctrines the generous construction of public and private corporate rights lovingly adumbrated in Story's landmark Dartmouth College concurrence. 8 No
wonder then that, as Story surveyed the scene from his lonely eminence, all seemed lost.
Like the gaunt visage memorialized in Mathew Brady's famous daguerreotype (ca. 1844), the old Judge portrayed in Story's later opinions and letters seems often to be a worn and despairing reactionary,
anachronistic even in his own day, irrelevant to ours, unworthy of attention or emulation. 9 It is a sad picture indeed. It is also shockingly
incomplete and fundamentally inaccurate, as readers of Kent
Newmyer's splendid new biography will quickly discover. 10 The Story
who emerges from Newmyer's pages is a fuller and vastly more appealing figure: capable of melancholy over professional reverses and
personal tragedies, yes, but withal a figure of Olympian accomplishments and energies, a warm patriot, a generous husband, father and
friend, a man whose vision, idealism and elemental decency were so
marked that, upon his death in 1845, even his sometime adversary,
Chief Justice Taney, was moved to mourn the nation's loss as "irrepa5. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) (approving issuance of paper money by bank chartered and
owned by state).
6. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 350. In Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830), interpreting art.
I, § 10, cl. 1 of the Constitution, Marshall's opinion for the Court had broadly prohibited state
issuance of "bills of credit."
7. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (narrowly construing private bridge company's legislative
charter so as to allow construction of competing bridge by second company).
8. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Marshall's
somewhat narrowly premised opinion, while sufficient for the plaintifrs purpose, had prompted
Story to a more general inquiry "into the nature, rights, and duties of aggregate corporations at
common law." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667 (Story, J., concurring).
9. Judicial and academic critiques of Story's contributions to the law - not to say his person
- are abundant and well known. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock
(Feb. 17, 1928), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETIERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 214-15 (M. Howe 2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as HOLMES-POLLOCK LETIERS] (deriding Story's belief in the possibility of a
"general law" as the quest for a "brooding omnipresence in the sky"); J. GRAY, THE NATURE
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 253 (2d ed. 1921) (accusing Story of "dogmati[sm]," "restless vanity" and a "reputation for learning greater even than the learning itself"). The particular object
of Holmes' and Gray's disparagements was Story's much maligned opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (sanctioning the application of federal common law, rather than state law,
in diversity cases concerning "commercial jurisprudence"). Story's low reputation among modern law students has been well summarized by Grant Gilmore, who phrased the issue as a question of "whether [Story] was more stupid than he was wicked, or, alternatively, more wicked
than he was stupid." Gilmore, Book Review, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 244, 244 (1971) (reviewing an
earlier biography of Story).
10. Newmyer is Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story is the twenty-fourth volume of the American Society for Legal History's distinguished Studies in Legal History.

848

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 84:846

rable, utterly irreparable m:· this generation, for there is nobody equal
to him." 11
.•:
·
Taney was right. No ·figure of Story's era even roughly compares
with him in terms of impact on the American legal system. Plausible
cases can be made that one or another of Story's contemporaries or
near-contemporaries, including Marshall, were greater judges. 12 But
Story was a man· of 'inariy talents and many roles. Lawyer, politician,
judge, scholar, teacher, publicist, legislative draftsman, codifier: it is
almost impossible to name a law-related role that Story did not at one
time in his long career perform, and perform superbly. Miraculously,
Newmyer manages t{) present his ~ubject informatively, and even entertainingly, in each of these varied·guises, and to discern in each the
common talents and traits that c;ombined in the person of Joseph Story
to produce a great life in the law. The result is not the emaciated
image of the Brady portrait, still le8s the forlorn figure of popular
memory. Instead, Newmyer reveals a remarkable human being of rare
accomplishments, whose life and work are aptly summarized in his
biographer's becoming sobriquet: "Statesman of the Old Republic." 13
II

Story was born on September 18, 1779 in Marblehead, Massachusetts, then British North America's sixth-ranking metropolis in population and, in fishing, its first. His father, Elisha, had helped dump tea
into Boston Harbor at the very outset of the Revolution and had
11. Roger Taney to Richard Peters, Jr. (Nov. 14, 1845), Richard Peters Papers, Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
12. In addition to his ~ndoubted abilities, of course, Marshall had the great advantage of
being Chief Justice. As such, he spoke for the Court in many of its greatest pronouncements.
Story proved equal to the challenge, however, on those occasions when the opportunity to announce the Court's decisions fell to him. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816), in which Marshall disqualified himself owing to a personal interest in the litigation.
Also, Story's opinions on circuit displayed both consummate scholarship and an unrivaled familiarity with the practical affairs that he was called to decide and shape. See, e.g., De Lovio v. Boit,
7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776), a leading admiralty decision; and United States v.
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), a pre-Prigg attempt to
curtail slavery, this time by limiting the rights of vessels engaged in the slave trade. In addition,
Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, published in 1833, quickly became the most influential
statement of constitutional nationalism since the Federalist Papers, and remained so for at least
the rest of the century.
Story would have liked to be Chief Justice himself. But the post was already filled by Marshall upon Story's arrival on the Court in 1811; and, although he performed the responsibilities
of senior judge effectively in the Term following Marshall's death, no doubt he knew full well
that Jackson would never appoint the "most dangerous man in America" to fill the nation's
highest judicial office. Joseph Story to Sarah Waldo Story (his wife) (Jan. 27, 1833), reprinted in
2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 1, at 119.
13. Newmyer's beginning chapters provide essentially chronological accounts of Story's ~arly
life, his brief dalliance with politics, and his ascension to the bench. An epilogue narrates Story's
final years and examines his legacy. In between, Newmyer organizes his chapters thematically
around such topics as nationalism, economic growth, sectionalism and slavery - the problems,
as he says, "with which Story as a judicial statesman grappled." P. xv.
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served with Washington at Long Island,, White· Plains and Trenton.
Joseph's mother, Mehitable Pedrick Story (Elisha's second wife), in
her one recorded utterance, is· reported to have ·admonished her firstborn: "Now, Joe, I've sat up and tended you many a night when you
were a child, and don't you dare not be a great man." 14
.
By 1798, at the· .tender ·age· of eighteen, Story)1ad a.Cquired a
Harvard degree and a lifelo'Ilg love;C?f scholarsliip1 15 ' By l801;:lie had
completed his apprenticeship 'with two of Massachusetts' ID,ost successful lawyers16 and been admitted to the Essex County bar, at which
he quickly pr9spered. By 1805, he had been elected to the Massachus.etts legislature and, by mos, to. tlie United St~tes :tJouse. qf_ Representatives.17 By 1811, disillusioned by t1ie vicissitudes and untidiness
of politics, he had published four significant pieces of legal scholarship18-and, by year's end, he had been freed by an, unexpected appointment to the Supreme Court "to pursue, what of all things I
admire, juridical studies."19
None of this is remarkable or new as histocy, except that from it
several factors crucial to Story's character and cfrreer cah be identified:
his roots deep in the soil of New England; the patriotism·ruid:ambition
inherited from his family; his own precociousness and industry; the
power of his intellect; his conscious_ decision to pursue a career in law
and scholarship, rather than in politics; and his general good fortune
in being who he was, when and where he was.
The latter point, in particular, requires elaboration. 'Newmyer ar14. 1 LIFE AND LEITERS, supra note 1, at 22 (purportedly recounting a reminiscence by
Story's mother to his son, William Wetmore Story).
15. Story's first love, although clearly not his principal aptitude, had been poetry. Delicacy
precludes any reproduction of those efforts here.
16. Samuel Sewall of Marblehead and Samuel Putnam of Salem.
17. Story secured both posts flying the colors of the Republican party, a circumstance that
caused him no little embarrassment among his conservative friends in later years. As he explained to his son, however, two decades after the conclusion of his brief foray into partisan
politics: "A Virginia Republican of that day, was very different from a Massachusetts Republican, and the anti-federal doctrines of the former state then had ... very little support or influence
in the latter State, notwithstanding a concurrence in political action upon general subjects." Joseph Story to William w. Story (Jan. 23, 1831), reprinted in J. STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 27 (W. Story ed. 1852).
18. A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1805), and new editions of Chitty's A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE (1809), Abbott's A TREATISE OF THE LAW
RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN (1810), and Lawe's A PR~CTiCAL TREATISE ON
PLEADING IN AssUMPSIT (1811). In each of these early publications, Story selected leading
English cases and demonstrated, by extensive annotation and reference to relevant American
decisions (most of.which remained unreported), how they applied to the United States.
19. Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Nov. 30, 1811), reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LEITERS,
supra note 1, at 201.
Justice William Cushing's death in 1810 opened up the Court's New England seat. Story,
although eminently qualified for the post, had been an indifferent Republiban· by strict Jeffersonian standards and was no better than fourth on President Madison's list of possible appointees.
Levi Lincoln and John Quincy Adams both said no to Madison; and Alexander Wolcott, who
accepted the nomination, was told no by the Senate.
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gues persuasively that Story's life and work must be seen as a "singular commingling of history and biography" (p. 387). He and his
generation were located in time and place precisely at the confluence
of Enlightenment idealism and Revolutionary pragmatism. His immediate forebears had defied all odds to impose their will upon history.
Their children's challenge, amidst the seemingly endless possibilities of
the early nineteenth century, was to secure the promise of the Revolution in a way that would endure for those who came after. In these
extraordinary circumstances, Story's natural genius blossomed. To
quote Newmyer: "Story was great because he captured the unique
lawmaking, system-building potential of the early republic" (p. xvi).
To help us in understanding a world so far removed from our own,
Newmyer analyzes two concepts central to the thinking of Story and
his contemporaries. One was "republicanism." Wisely, Newmyer eschews any attempt to define the term as a narrow creed or monolithic
ideology. Rather, he presents it as a "cultural matrix" generated by
the Revolution itself, "within which Americans debated questions of
government, law, economics, and all else" (p. xvi). There was agreement among participants to the debate that America had been set
apart by Providence for a special destiny, but there was furious debate
about the nature of that destiny. Popular sovereignty too, at least as
distinguished from monarchical rule, was a given, but the nature of
popular sovereignty was in no way settled. What were the roles, respectively, of the people and their representatives? Among the people's representatives, what level of government, and within each level
which branch or branches, was best suited to govern? In a nation in
the process of creating itself, the list of issues to be resolved seemed
beyond number. Far from decreeing a solution, the Constitution bequeathed to the post-revolutionary generation by the founders merely
marked out the parameters of the debate. And each of the participants' visions, not surprisingly, tended to be framed by his own peculiar "window on America" (p. 117): Virginia for Jefferson, for
example; New England for Story.
'
On one matter, however, all of the protagonists in the drama that
was early nineteenth-century America passionately agreed: each assume9 the preemptive importance of advancing the national destiny,
however it might be defined, by every means at the actor's command.
For lawyers, as Newmyer carefully explains, the principal means at
hand was a second cultural given of Story's age: "legal science." Like
republicanism, legal science was vaguely defined. The term had yet to
acquire the strongly normative connotation that it has to modem ears.
Instead, in the young Republic, legal science "[m]ost often ... meant
simply systematic law - the mirror opposite, that is to say, of the
haphazard, pluralistic, localized nature of early national jurisprudence" (p. xiv). In this sense, the term might mean little more than
clarifying, rationalizing and disseminating the principles of the com-
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man law as it had evolved, and was evolving, in the United States all constrained by the application of neutral, scientific principles of
interpretation and development. In short, the aim was well-controlled
legal reform. This seems to be the principal sense in which Story, as a
republican lawyer, understood legal science. No doubt, this "juristic"
dimension of Story's thought was subject, as a purely intellectual exercise, to the dangers of rigidity and dogmatism. But - pace Jefferson! ·
- Story's preferred approach to the conundrums of legal science was
pragmatic and thus attentive to the needs of the society around him.
The only difficulty, from the viewpoint of Southern agrarians, was the
nature of the society with which Story, by birth, education and professional experience, was familiar. If, as Newmyer demonstrates, Story's
law "took its character and spirit from the practical needs of real pea.. ple," inevitably the foundations of his legal science became "the needs
of the business community and the imperatives of the market as he
saw them operate in New England" (p. 116). Thus, by improving law
through the application of legal science, Story hoped to create a "national commercial Utopia" (p. 378).
All of this explains a good deal. It provides essential background,
for example, to an informed understanding of Story's vast output of
opinions, both on circuit and in the Supreme Court, during his thirtyfour years on the bench.20 Typical of Story's early efforts is De Lovio
v. Boit, 21 an 1815 circuit court opinion described by Justice Frankfurter as the "classic" American admiralty decision. 22 De Lovio concerned an insurance policy written by Boston businessmen on a
Spanish vessel sailing out of Havana to ply the foreign slave trade.
The insurers had refused to pay for loss owing to the ship's capture,
and had denied federal court jurisdiction over such maritime contracts. Anticipating the arrival of the case from the District CoUrt,
which sided with the insurers on the jurisdictional question, Story advised Supreme Court Reporter Henry Wheaton that he would deliver
in De Lovio "a very elaborate opinion upon the whole Admiralty jurisdiction as well as over torts and contracts, and [would] review all the
common law decisions on this subject."23 He did. Story's conclusion,
buttressed by an exhaustive survey of reported decisions (both at common law and under Continental systems), was that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, founded on article III, section 2 of the
Constitution, rightfully extended to "all maritime contracts ... and to
all torts, injuries, and offences, on the high seas, and in ports ... as far
20. Appointed to the Court at age thirty-two (the youngest Justice ever), Story served until
his death in 1845. Only five Justices (John Marshall, Stephen Field, the first John Marshall
Harlan, Hugo Black, and William 0. Douglas) have served longer.
21. 7 -F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
22. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 691 (1950).
23. Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Sept. 5, 1815), reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LETIERS, supra
note 1, at 267.
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as the ebb and flow of the tide." 2 4
Detailed though Story's scholarship in De Lovio may be, his decision rested not just on history, the Constitution and "juridical logic,"
but also, as he confes~ed in the conclusion of his opinion, on "national
policy" and the:'advantages resulting to the commerce and navigation
of the United States, from a uniformity of rules and decisions in all
maritime questions .... " 25 De Lovio itself did not fully achieve such
uniformity. While conferring broad jurisdiction on the federal courts,
it did not oust ~tate court jurisdiction over maritime contracts in general or marine insurance questions in particular; nor did the decision
become law beyond the First Circuit, thanks to the parties' failure to
appeal Story's ruling to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, De Lovio
was a considerable victory for Story's expansive views; and, in company with similar decisions rendered by Circuit Justice Story during
his early years on the bench, it illustrates vividly his determination "to
facilitate commercial development" by applying legal science to the
facts of life in the marketplace, and the "fusion of scholarship, practicality, and long-range economic calculation in [his] judging" (p. 123).
Swift v. Tyson, 26 decided nearly three decades later but this time in
Story's role as Supreme Court Justice, teaches the same lessons; and a
careful reading of the case, as Newmyer demonstrates, does much to
redeem the modern-day reputations of both the decision and its author. The issue to be resolved in Swift was relatively narrow: did the
Rules of Decision Act, 27 which governed diversity actions, require the
federal courts to apply local common law in determining the validity
of a negotiable instrument? In a brief opinion by Story, the Court held
that the transfer of a bill of exchange in order to discharge the transferor's preexistent debt rendered the transferee a holder in due course
despite defects that might have destroyed the value of the bill as between the original parties thereto - and this, notwithstanding the pos24. De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 441. Story's aggressive attitude toward extending federal jurisdiction is well conveyed by the observation that, "if a bucket of water were brought into his court
with a corn cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States over it." Note, Extension ofFederal Jurisdiction Over State Canals, 37 AM. L. REV. 911,
916 (1903). But see Story's doubtless painful act of judicial self-abnegation in The Steamboat
Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), denying a libel for wages because the service
upon which wages were due was not "substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sen
or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide." The line of demarcation in DeLovio and
Jefferson, obviously, was consistent. As Newmyer points out: "In DeLovio legal science worked
to achieve the broad policy goals that Story wanted. In Jefferson he demonstrated a willingness
to stick by 'science' when it pinched as well as when it comforted." P. 208.
25. 7 F. Cas. at 443.
26. 41 U.S.:(16 Pe4) 1 (1842).
27. Opginally enacted section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act
provided:
.,
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall.otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law iv ¢e courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
1 Stat. 92 (1789): The statute, slightly amended, is now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
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sibility that New York law, as established by the courts of that state,
was otherwise. Story's opinion rested on his distinction between "state
laws strictly local" and "general commercial law." The former, he
said, consisted of "rights and titles to things having a permanent locality" (mainly real estate) and was evinced by state statutes and judicial
constructions thereof. In these local matters, federal diversity courts
were bound by state law. Not so, however, with respect to "contracts
and other instruments of a commercial nature," which Story considered "not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed
and permanent operation." As to those matters, the federal courts
could and should make up their own minds, based on "the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."28
In its time, Swift was hardly a controversial decision: on the issue
actually decided, Story spoke for a unanimous Court,29 and his opinion was barely noticed by contemporary newspapers and periodicals. 30
After the Civil War, of course, the Court expanded the category of
general commercial law created in Swift ·to encompass a variety of
other matters, including municipal bonds and torts. 3 I Story himself
can hardly be charged with those follies. 32 Still less should he be pilloried for having rendered, in his dotage, an "unconstitutional" decision. 33 The central issue in Swift was not federal-state relations, but
whether there should be uniformity and certainty in commercial transactions throughout the United States. 34 On that question, even Story's
28. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
29. In his concurring opinion, Justice Catron took issue with Story's view, expressed in dicta,
that bills taken by way of security for an antecedent debt, no less than those taken in payment,
were free of prior defenses. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 23.
30. T. FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 17-18 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Baltimore & O. R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
32. As Newmyer himself admits, Story's opinion in Swift, as developed by the Court in later
decisions, "produced legal confusion, pitted state judiciaries against federal courts, and put the
Supreme Court itself on the political firing line." P. 335. Even so strong a critic as Justice
Holmes, however, conceded that, had "Bradley, Harlan, et al." stuck to the matter "dealt with"
by Story, "no great harm" would have resulted. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick
Pollock (Feb. 17, 1928), reprinted in 2 HoLMES-POLLOC~ LETTERS, supra note 9, at 215.
33. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (Brandeis, J., quoting Holmes, J.).
34. See also Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,.36 U.S. (U Pet.) 420 (1837). In his
majority opinion, Chief Justice Taney had insisted that ari ambiguous, monopoly-granting corporate charter be construed strictly "against the adventurers, and in favor of the public," thereby in
effect destroying the property of the grantees. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 544-53. The decision provided
a spur to creative (not to say rapacious) capitalism durir;ig the remai!lder of the nineteenth century. Certainly, Story was no less enthusiastic an advocate qf com~erce than Taney. His dissent
can be explained in part by revulsion at what Newmyer ~s the "di,sjµnction between law and
morality that Taney's instrumentalism produced." P. 232. But Story also feared the damage
done by the majority to the promotion of a uniform, predictable, nation-building law of commerce. "For my own part," he wrote in his dissent, "I can conceive of no surer plan to arrest all
public improvements, founded on private capital and ente!l>rise, than to make the outlay of that
capital uncertain, and questionable both as to security, aIJ.d as to productiveness." 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 608.
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Jacksonian brethren agreed with him35 - as would proponents of the
Uniform Commercial Code almost a century later, ironically just as
Swift itself was being interred in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 36
Viewed in this light, there is nothing radical or usurpatory about
Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson: as in his circuit court opinions, he
applied the tools of legal science for the profoundly practical purpose
of forging the national commercial marketplace that he believed would
strengthen and preserve the Republic. In this, Newmyer says, Story
merely did "what he had been doing all along, what he did incomparably well, and what the age accepted as legitimate" (p. 342).
Scientific judging was not the only role that Story, in the view of
contemporaries, performed incomparably well. In his scholarly and
academic endeavors, he was clearly without peer in his age; and here,
as well, the imprint of what Newmyer calls his republicanism and
legal science is much in evidence.
Story's scholarship prior to his appointment to the Court has already been noted. 37 During the next eighteen years, he continued to
publish widely on a variety oflegal topics, both in his own name38 and
anonymously on behalf of others. 39 His most famous contributions to
the literature of the law, however, date from his incumbency in the
Dane Professorship at Harvard Law School between 1829 and 1845.
The terms of the professorship required publication of the lectures delivered under its auspices. In all, Story produced eleven ample
volumes on nine major areas of American law. Except for three
volumes on the Constitution,40 all of the works concerned private law
and, more specifically, commercial law or matters clearly ancillary to
35. See generally T. FREYER, supra note 30, at 35-43.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. See note 18 supra. Newmyer says that, by 1811, Story "was the most promising and
prolific legal scholar in New England." P. 70.
38. Among the works to which Story signed his name were a statutory compilation entitled
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1827) and the fourth American edition of Abbott's SHIPPING
(1829).
39. Story contributed generously, but without attribution, to the extensive scholarly annota·
tions published by Supreme Court Reporter Henry Wheaton in the Court's official Reports be·
tween 1816 and 1821, and to the Digest of the Court's decisions published by Wheaton in 1821.
See 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 1, at 280-93, 303-04; Joyce, supra note•, at 1331-37. He
also produced a series of unsigned articles on legal subjects (including Courts of the U. States,
Law, Legislation and Codes, and Natural Law) for Francis Lieber's Encyclopaedia Americana,
published in multiple volumes beginning in 1829. P. 450.
40. CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A PRELIMI·
NARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES DEFORE
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (3 vols. 1833) [hereinafter cited as J. STORY, COMMEN·
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION]. The work achieved enormous success at all levels. It appeared
in several abridgments: one for college and high school students (1833); one for students younger
still (1834); and one, entitled A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States,
suitable for the general reader (1840). The full work, updated and annotated by Thomas M.
Cooley and others, went through five American editions and remained in print through the turn
of the century. In addition, the Commentaries were enthusiastically received by scholars and
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it. 41 As Newmyer's thorough analysis demonstrates, the commentaries were more than a tour de force of learning and technique. 42 They
were also interrelated and integral parts of Story's "grand effort to
create an American commercial common law suitable both to the
needs of the new capitalism and to the values of old republicanism" (p.
282). As applied law, they were eminently successful. Newmyer admiringly calls them "working law for working lawyers" (p. 303). The
practicing bar obviously agreed: altogether, Story's eight volumes on
private law went through seventy-one editions, many of them remaining in circulation for a half-century after their first publication. ·
Many of Story's readers, of course, were his own former students
at Harvard Law School, who had also been the first auditors of the
commentaries in lecture form. Story's efforts in imagining and bringing into being the first "national" law school are too well known to
require repetition here. 43 What is important for present purposes is
the complete coincidence that existed between Story's Harvard reforms and the purposes that animated him in his other roles. As
Story's influence on the Court waned during the last decade and a half
of his life, he embraced his duties at the Law School in the fervent
hope that, at Harvard, he could employ scientific law to train scientific
judges in England, Scotland, Germany and France - with translations into French, Spanish and
Portuguese.
Story's first edition was notable, in particular, for its "Concluding Remarks,'' in which his
republican fire shone with special brilliance:
If these Commentaries shall but inspire in the rising generation a more ardent love of their
country, an unquenchable thirst for liberty, and a profound reverence for the constitution
and the Union, then they will have accomplished all, that their author ought to desire. Let
the American youth never forget, that they possess a noble inheritance, bought by the toils,
and sufferings, and blood of their ancestors; and capable, if wisely improved, and faithfully
guarded, of transmitting to their latest posterity all the substantial blessings of life, the
peaceful enjoyment of liberty, property, religion, and independence. The structure has been
erected by architects of consummate skill and fidelity; its foundations are solid; its compartments are beautiful, as well as useful; its arrangements are full of wisdom and order; and its
defences are impregnable from without. It has been reared for immortality, if the work of
man may justly aspire to such a title. It may, nevertheless, perish in an hour by the folly, or
corruption, or negligence of its only keepers, THE PEOPLE.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 759-60.
41. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (1832); COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834); COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1836); COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (1838); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1839); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1841); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF
EXCHANGE (1843); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (1845). Story died
before completing his grand survey of American jurisprudence with planned commentaries on
admiralty and maritime law. P. 381.
42. Truth to tell, the commentaries have not escaped criticism as verbose, tedious, diffuse,
eclectic - or worse. But even Holmes, who at times had harsh words for Story's scholarship,
acknowledged that, on the whole, he had "done more than any other English-speaking man [of
the nineteenth century] to make the law luminous and easy to understand." O.W. HOLMES, The
Use of Law Schools, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 41 (1920).
43. See, e.g., 1 c. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDITIONS lN AMERICA 266-77, 413-543 (1908); 2 id. at 1-69; see also A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 92-139 (1967).
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lawyers, whose sound learning and solid common sense might save the
Republic from the dangers of democratic excess. How well he succeeded is a matter subject to debate, but the impact of his vision is not.
By the final year of Story's life, Harvard had truly become, in the
words of Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's April 1845 1report to the Harvard Corporation, "[a]n American law school."44 Like
his friend Story, to whom he gave the lion's share of the credit, Shaw
saw the revitalized law school as
a union of educated young men ... who afterwards distribute over all
the United States, may be expected to have conspicuous and influential
places in Society, and may be looked to as a means of Union and harmony tending to the advancement of the common and general interests
of the whole people. 45

If the old Judge himself smiled on reading Shaw's vision of the new
Harvard, no doubt he had earned the pleasure.
Story's accomplishments in his many other legal roles - as publicist,4 6 legislative draftsman47 and codifier,48 for example - defy retelling in brief compass. In all of his roles, however, Story's purpose
44. Quoted in 2 C. WARREN, supra note 43, at 37 n.l (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. In addition to his more formal scholarship, Story contributed articles to a variety of
contemporary publications, including North American Review, American Law Review, and American Jurist and Law Magazine. The character and purpose of many of these efforts is suggested
by the title of one that appeared in New England Magazine in August 1834: Statesmen-Their
Rareness and Importance: Daniel Webster. 7 NEW ENG. MAG. 89 (1834).
47. As early as 1812, Story had drawn up and forwarded to Attorney General William
Pinkney a "sketch" for an improved federal criminal code. P. 103. In his middle years, his
projects included a national bankruptcy act, which he drafted and which his ally, Daniel Webster, promoted in Congress. P. 172. And shortly before his death, at the request of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and with the approval of the Court, Story prepared an act, subsequently
codified at 5 Stat. 726 (1845), extending federal jurisdiction over inland waters to federally licensed vehicles employed in interstate commerce. P. 208.
48. Story believed in what might be called "moderate codification." He was no Benthamite;
nor did he oppose codification altogether. His theory of codification was perhaps best exempli·
fied in his 1825 exchange ofletters with Henry Wheaton concerning the latter's responsibilities as
a revisor of New York's statute laws. Wheaton had described the project to Story as "fill[ing] up
the lacunae" left by the legislature in certain areas and "simplifying the practice" in others,
rather than as a wholesale revision of existing law. Henry Wheaton to Joseph Story (Sept. 19,
1825), Henry Wheaton Papers, The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City. In his response,
Story urged that the New York revisors codify the common law itself, or "at least the part which
is most reduced to principles & is of daily extensive application." Story's theory was not that the
legislature should create principles oflaw, but that it might clarify and refine those that had been
developed over time by the common law courts. "I am in favour of a Code," he informed Wheaton, "because I think it may reduce to certainty, method, & exactness much of the law, already
passed by judicial tribunals & thus give to the public the means, with[in] a reasonable compass,
of ascertaining their own rights & duties in many of the most interesting concerns of ••• life." In
addition, a code might greatly abridge "the labours & exhausting researches of the profession."
Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Oct. 1, 1825), Henry Wheaton Papers. In an 1837 report to the
Governor of Massachusetts, written in his capacity as chair of that state's special code commission, Story identified the following three areas as particularly susceptible of codification: criminal law; procedure and the law of evidence; and commercial law. The codification movement in
Massachusetts eventually died, due not to Story's efforts but to lack of enthusiasm on the part of
figures more conservative than he. Pp. 279-80.
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was constant: to bring consistent, carefully conceived legal principles
to bear in resolving the great political and economic problems of his
own generation, and so to safeguard the precious inheritance bequeathed to it by those who made the Revolution.
For much of Story's career, his purpose and style suited perfectly
the needs of the age. America was young and abuilding. "[Story's] cry
for national institutions," Newmyer writes, "was commensurate with
the dream of national greatness" (p. 114); and his prescriptions for
greatness, by and large, worked remarkably well. Toward the end of
his life, however, it became painfully and inescapably clear, to Story
and to his generation, that republicanism and legal science were incapable of curing one grievous ill of the body politic, an ill that was also,
ironically, a legacy of the framers whom Story so much revered. The
debilitating disease in question was slavery. Story's deep personal
aversion to slavery, evidenced from his earliest days on the bench, is
beyond doubt. 49 But the Constitution itself, that bulwark of republican liberty, unflinchingly acknowledged the existence of human bondage in article I, section 2, clause 3 (the three-fifths clause), and
provided in article IV, section 2, clause 3 (the rendition clause) that
persons "held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another ... shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." Much as he
himself abhorred slavery, Story recognized these appalling provisions
for what they were: the crucial compromise between slaveholding and
free states that had made the Union possible. They were, moreover,
the law of the land, which he as a judge was sworn to uphold - and,
with them, the measures adopted by Congress for their implementation.
Story's discomfort in deciding Prigg v. Pennsylvania 50 can readily
be imagined. His health had already begun to fail by 1842,51 and he
knew that his remaining years on the Court must be few. An opinion
sustaining the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was bound to be condemned
in the North and particularly in New England, a region whose values
Story had long embodied and sought to spread throughout the nation.
Nonetheless, in a forceful opinion employing by now familiar techniques of reasoning, he concluded that the Act must be upheld - but
also that the extradition of fugitive slaves lay exclusively within the
49. In his circuit court charges, which were printed and circulated throughout New England,
Story attacked slavery directly. See, e.g., the charge to the grand jury quoted in 1 LIFE AND
LETIERS, supra note 1, at 336-47. In passing on the legality of the international slave trade in
United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), he
condemned the practice as "incurably unjust and inhuman" and "repugnant to the great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and morality,
and the eternal maxims of social justice."
50. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
51. Story missed the entire 1843 Term due to ill health.
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jurisdiction of the federal government. As later explained by his son,
Story intended by the latter doctrine "that the State Legislatures
[should be] prohibited from interfering even to assist in giving effect to
the [rendition] clause."52 To put the matter more plainly in terms of
the Northern states (which after all were the states where rendition
would inevitably be sought), not only could the states not pass laws
interfering with the constitutional right of masters to recover slaves
but, in addition, they were forbidden to legislate in any manner that
would facilitate rendition! And significantly, in the wake of Story's
exclusivist ruling in Prigg, a series of acts passed by Northern legislatures (beginning with Massachusetts in 1843) actually prohibited state
officials from aiding in the extradition of fugitive slaves. 53
Was the result in Prigg, then, a "triumph of freedom," as Story is
reported by his son to have insisted "repeatedly and earnestly" to family and friends? 54 Newmyer thinks not, and suggests that Story's opinion, taken as a whole, "was influenced more by his fear of abolition
than by his desire to free fugitive slaves" (p. 377). Indeed, Newmyer
doubts that Story had any grand strategy in mind in constructing the
opinion, conjectures that he agreed reluctantly to write on behalf of
the majority, and concludes that, in the end, his overriding objective
was simply to preserve the constitutional compromise on slavery that
he saw as the last barrier against dissolution of the Union. That assessment, although incapable of conclusive proof, rings true. Story's dark
forebodings concerning the future of the Republic, and his sober
awareness of the limitations and responsibilities of judicial office, were
eloquently manifested in his remarks to the students of Harvard Law
School as the year 1843 drew to a close. In discussing the painful
necessity, under the Constitution, of returning fugitive slaves to their
masters, he observed:
If one part of the country may disregard one part of the Constitution,

another section may refuse to obey that part which seems to bear hard
upon its interests, and thus the Union will become a "mere rope of
sand"; and the Constitution, worse than a dead letter, an apple of discord in our midst, a fruitful source of reproach, bitterness, and hatred,
and in the end discord and civil war. 55
52. 2 LIFE AND LETIERS, supra note 1, at 392 (emphasis in original).
53. See T. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH,
1780-1861 (1974).
54. 2 LIFE AND LETIERS, supra note l, at 392; see also R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (antislavery jurisprudence).
55. As recorded in the journal of the young Rutherford B. Hayes. 1 C. WILLIAMS, THE LIFE
OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES, NINETEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36-37
(1914). See Story's "Concluding Remarks" in his Commentaries on the Constitution:
[T]he slightest attention to the history of the national constitution must satisfy every reflecting mind, how many difficulties attended its formation and adoption, from real or imaginary
differences of interests, sectional feelings, and local institutions. It is an attempt to create a
national sovereignty, and yet to preserve the state sovereignties; though it is impossible to
assign definite boundaries in every case to the powers of each. The influence of the dis-

February-April 1986]

Statesman of the Old Republic

859

Barely a year later, Story quietly informed family and close friends of
his determination shortly to leave the Court, having concluded sadly
"that by remaining on the Bench I could accomplish no good, either
for myself or for my country." 56 He died, still in harness, on September 10, 1845, grateful for his own "prosperity and success ... in life" 57
but powerless at last to spare the old Republic from the darkness of
the onrushing night.
III
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic is an unmitigated success. This exemplary biography is the first

thoroughgoing study of Story's intellectual life, and as such succeeds
brilliantly in conveying both the main influences on Story's thought
and the principal themes in his work. Along the way, however,
Newmyer manages also to present a fascinating portrait of Story's
world. This is Story's biography, yes; but it is the biography of an age
as well. Name a leading figure or vital issue of the early nineteenth
century and, virtually without exception, he, she or it will appear in
these pages. Each is deftly summarized and sketched; all are accorded
scrupulously fair treatment by a master historian. 58 Newmyer should,
and one trusts will, receive a variety of honors for this volume. It is
the product of painstaking and unprecedented research. It is carefully
conceived, illuminating, rich in detail, and entertainingly written. 59 It
is absolutely first-rate.
What elements must concur to produce a biography of this calibre?
Opinions will differ. A partial list, however, might include: talent,
turbing causes, which, more than once in the convention, were on the point of breaking up
the Union, have since immeasurably increased in concentration and vigour.... If, under
these circumstances, the Union should once be broken up, it is impossible, that a new constitution should ever be formed, embracing the whole Territory. We shall be divided into
several nations or confederacies, rivals in power and interest, too proud to brook injury, and
too close to make retaliation distant or ineffectual. Our very animosities will, like those of
all other kindred nations, become more deadly, because our lineage, laws, and language are
the same. Let the history of the Grecian and Italian republics warn us of our dangers. The
national constitution is our last, and our only security.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSfITUTION, supra note 40, at 758-59.
56. Joseph Story to Ezekial Bacon (Apr. 12, 1845), reprinted in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra
note 1, at 528.
57. As recalled by his son, William Wetmore Story, in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 1, at
540.
58. Newmyer writes that his years in the trenches, struggling to understand the ambiguities
and seeming contradictions of Story and his era, have taught him "the wisdom of the old-fashioned rules of historiography: the need for historians to get out of their own skin, to avoid
anachronism, to judge by past, not present, standards." P. xiii.
59. Law professors will envy Newmyer for somehow escaping servitude to the Texas Style
Manual, an engine of the devil whose purpose is to make bad writing better - and good writing
worse. Cf Wessel, Computer Software for Writers: Helping the Bad, Hurting the Good?, Wall
St. J., July 7, 1986, at 13, col. 4 ("[F]ollowing rigid rules, the programs spew criticism of the
Gettysburg Address and make snide remarks about Mark Twain's 'The Adventures of Tom
Sawyer.'").
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obviously, on the part of the biographer, and hard work, too; copious
and available data; a subject who is significant, interesting, and perhaps underappreciated or even misunderstood in the modem age; and,
at least ideally, a good "fit" between biographer and subject. The lastnamed factor, one suspects, was especially important in the present
instance. The very first words of Newmyer's story record the following tale:
Some years ago, as I sat pondering the Crowninshield papers at the
Peabody Museum in Salem, Massachusetts, an old man sat down across
the table from me. He desperately needed a shave and, in truth, looked
totally down, out, and bedraggled. He fixed me with a disconcerting
stare for some time before asking ifl were the person working on Joseph
Story. I confessed my presumption, whereupon he fired several remarkably informed questions at me that led me to conclude that he was an
unfrocked history professor-or perhaps a crashed biographer of Judge
Story. Having queried me and found me wanting, not to say speechless,
he rose abruptly. "Young man," he said with a grim intensity as he
turned to leave, "studying Joseph Story could ruin your career!" [p. ix]

Clearly, Newmyer's career has survived his prolonged meditation
on the old Judge, and even prospered, deservedly, as a result of it.
Newmyer is a generous man. Besides the old fellow at the Peabody,
he shares credit in his Acknowledgments with innumerable libraries,
archives, historical societies, foundations and publications, and no
fewer than thirty-nine named individuals, who have helped him along
the way in completing this superb biography. But Newmyer does not
stop there, nor could he. In his Introduction, he adds thanks to one
final individual who has been his companion, on a daily basis, for almost thirty years: "I confess a strange sense of gratitude," Newmyer
writes, "to the old judge for being such a demanding teacher and such
good company" (p. xiii). Story, wherever he may be now, should be
grateful also. Biographers, no less than their subjects, are revealed by
what they have written. In Kent Newmyer, the old Judge has had an
apt pupil - and, one suspects, good company, too.

